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INTRODUCTION
This essay considers the relationship between privacy and visibil-
ity in the networked information age. Visibility is an important deter-
minant of harm to privacy, but a persistent tendency to conceptualize
privacy harms and expectations in terms of visibility has created two
problems. First, focusing on visibility diminishes the salience and ob-
scures the operation of nonvisual mechanisms designed to render in-
dividual identity, behavior, and preferences transparent to third par-
ties. The metaphoric mapping to visibility suggests that surveillance is
simply passive observation rather than the active production of cate-
gories, narratives, and norms. Part I explores this problem and identi-
fies some of the reasons that US privacy jurisprudence has been par-
ticularly susceptible to it.
Second, even a broader conception of privacy harms as a function
of informational transparency is incomplete. Privacy has a spatial di-
mension as well as an informational dimension. The spatial dimension
of the privacy interest, which I characterize as an interest in avoiding
or selectively limiting exposure, concerns the structure of experienced
space. It is not negated by the fact that people in public spaces expect
to be visible to others present in those spaces, and it encompasses both
the arrangement of physical spaces and the design of networked
communications technologies. US privacy law and theory currently do
not recognize this interest at all. Part II argues that they should. Part
III argues that the spatial dimension of the privacy interest extends to
online conduct and considers some implications of that view for cur-
rent debates about expectations of privacy online. Part IV offers some
preliminary thoughts on how the privacy interest against exposure
might affect thinking about privacy self-defense.
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I. VISIBILITY AND TRANSPARENCY
Within US legal culture, debates about privacy traditionally have
reflected a relatively great concern with visibility and visual privacy
issues. Over the last decade, the principal contribution of what has
been dubbed the "information privacy law project"1 has been to refo-
cus both scholarly and popular attention on the other ways in which
contemporary practices of surveillance operate to render individuals
and their behaviors accessible in the networked information age. Yet
the information privacy law project remains more closely tied to visi-
bility than this description would suggest; its principal concern has
been with data trails made visible to others. And to the extent that the
information privacy law project conceptualizes privacy interests as
interests against informational accessibility, its grasp of the workings
and effects of surveillance is incomplete. Surveillance is only partly
about the gathering and dissemination of fixed, preexisting information
about identified individuals. Designations like "at risk," "no-fly," "soccer
moms," "business elite," and "shotguns and pickups" are not preexisting
facts. Surveillance also depends importantly on other, information-
creating activities that lie outside the frame of visibility altogether.
An implicit linkage between privacy and visibility is deeply em-
bedded in privacy doctrine. Within the common law of privacy, harms
to visual privacy and harms to information privacy are subject to dif-
ferent requirements of proof. Of the four privacy torts, two are pri-
marily visual and two primarily informational. The visual torts, intru-
sion upon seclusion and unauthorized appropriation of name or like-
ness, require only a showing that the conduct (the intrusion or appro-
priation) violated generally accepted standards for appropriate behav-
ior.2 The informational torts, unauthorized publication and false light,
are far more stringently limited (to "embarrassing" private facts and
to falsity).' To make out a more general claim to information privacy,
some have tried to characterize collections of personally identified
data visually, likening them to "portraits" or "images," but courts have
resisted the conflation of facts with faces.' The body of constitutional
privacy doctrine that defines unlawful "searches" regulates tools that
enable law enforcement to "see" activities as they are taking place
1 Neil M. Richards, The Information Privacy Law Project, 94 Georgetown L J 1087 (2006).
I should note that I am one of the scholars identified with this project.
2 See W. Page Keeton, et al, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 117 at 851-56 (West
5th ed 1984).
3 See id § 117 at 856-66.
4 See, for example, US News & World Report, Inc v Avrahami, 1996 WL 1065557, *6-7 (Va
Cir Ct); Dwyer v American Express Co, 652 NE2d 1351, 1355-56 (I11 App Ct 1995); Castro v NYT
Television, 851 A2d 88,98 (NJ Super Ct 2004).
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inside the home more strictly than tools for discovering information
about those activities after they have occurred.'
Within the academic literature on privacy, efforts to develop an
account of privacy interests in personal information have confronted
great skepticism, for reasons that seem closely linked to conventions
about visibility. Information privacy skeptics have argued that the in-
formation conveyed by most individual items of personal data is too
banal to trigger privacy interests. They have asserted, further, that pri-
vacy interests cannot attach to information voluntarily made "visible"
as part of an otherwise consensual transaction.
Under the influence of the information privacy law project, pri-
vacy discourse has changed. Many new legal and philosophical theo-
ries of privacy are organized explicitly around problems of informa-
tion privacy and "privacy in public." Some scholars assert a "constitu-
tive" relationship between flows of personal information and self-
development.6 Helen Nissenbaum argues that the collection and ag-
gregation of personal information disrupts expectations of "contextual
integrity" by allowing presence, appearance, and behavior in different
contexts to be juxtaposed.7 Drawing upon pragmatist philosophy and
phenomenology, Daniel Solove argues that "digital dossiers" threaten
a varied but related set of interests that are grounded in the logic of
everyday experience.!
These theories suggest that the persistent theme of visibility in
privacy discourse is a distraction from the more fundamental problem
of informational accessibility. Although the theories differ from each
other in important respects, an implicit premise of all of them is that
databases and personal profiles can communicate as much or more
than images. To the extent that privacy is conceived as encompassing a
more general interest against accessibility, the adage that "a picture is
worth a thousand words" requires rethinking. Visibility is an impor-
tant determinant of accessibility, but threats to privacy from visual
surveillance become most acute when visual surveillance and data-
based surveillance are integrated, enabling both real-time identifica-
5 See, for example, Kyllo v United States, 533 US 27, 29 (2001); California v Greenwood,
486 US 35,40-41 (1988). See also R v Tessling, [2004] 3 SCR 432,434 (Can). Kyllo was thought to
be a hard case precisely because it seemed to lie on the boundary between the two categories.
6 See, for example, Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject
as Object, 52 Stan L Rev 1373, 1424-25 (2000); Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State,
32 Conn L Rev 815, 856-57 (2000). See also Luciano Floridi, The Ontological Interpretation of
Informational Privacy, 7 Ethics & Info Tech 185, 194-99 (2005).
7 See generally Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 Wash L Rev 119
(2004). See also generally Jeffrey Rosen, The Unwanted Gaze: The Destruction of Privacy in
America (Random House 2000).
8 See generally Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 Cal L Rev 1087 (2002).
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tion of visual surveillance subjects and subsequent searches of stored
visual and databased surveillance records. And, for the most part, in-
formational accessibility does not result from a conscious decision to
target particular individuals. Rather, accessibility is embedded in the
design of social and technical institutions.'
Even as information privacy theorists have sought to shift the fo-
cus of the discussion about privacy interests, however, the terms of
both academic and public debate continue to return inexorably to
visibility, and more particularly to an understanding of surveillance as
direct visual observation by centralized authority figures. Within popu-
lar privacy discourse, this metaphoric mapping tends to be organized
around the anthropomorphic figure of Big Brother. Academic privacy
theorists have tended to favor the motif of the Panopticon, a model
prison proposed by Jeremy Bentham that consists of cells concentri-
cally arranged around a central guard tower, from which the prison
authority might see but not be seen." Historically and also etymologi-
cally, the Panopticon suggests that direct visual observation by a cen-
tralized authority is both the most effective means and the best exem-
plar of surveillance for social control.
It is not particularly surprising that the paradigm cases of privacy
invasion should be conceptualized in terms of sight. The cultural im-
portance of visibility extends well beyond privacy law, and well be-
yond law more generally. Within Western culture, vision is linked
metaphorically with both knowledge and power. The eye has served
throughout history as a symbol of both secular and religious authority.
The Judeo-Christian God is described as all-seeing, and worldly lead-
ers as exercising "oversight" or "supervision."" Cartesian philosophy
of mind posits that objects and ideas exist in the "unclouded" mind,
where truth is revealed by the "light of reason."" In the language of
9 See, for example, Daniel J. Solove, The Digital Person: Technology and Privacy in the
Information Age 97-101 (NYU 2004); Richards, 94 Georgetown L J at 1095-1102 (cited in note
1); Schwartz, 32 Conn L Rev at 831 (cited in note 6), citing Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica:
The Formulation of Information Policy Rules through Technology, 76 Tex L Rev 553, 556 (1998).
10 See, for example, Sonia K. Katyal, The New Surveillance, 54 Case W Res L Rev 297,317-19
(2003); Rosen, The Unwanted Gaze at 213-14 (cited in note 7); Schwartz, 32 Conn L Rev at 852-53
(cited in note 6). See also Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison 195-209
(Vintage 1977) (Alan Sheridan, trans) (describing the Panopticon).
11 The Hebrew Bible refers to God in a number of ways, including El-Roi, or "God who
sees." See, for example, Genesis 16:13. The all-seeing God figures prominently in the religious
iconography of the Renaissance, and the linkages between vision, power, and knowledge con-
tinue in the subsequent secular iconography of the Enlightenment. See Astrit Schmidt-
Burkhardt, The All-Seer: God's Eye as Proto-surveillance, in Thomas Y. Levin, Ursula Frohne,
and Peter Weibel, eds, Ctrl [Space]: Rhetorics of Surveillance from Bentham to Big Brother 17,
18-26 (MIT 2002).
12 See Rene Descartes, Rules for the Direction of the Mind, in 31 Great Books of the West-
ern World 4 (Encyclopedia Britannica 1952) (Elizabeth S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross, trans). See
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everyday conversation, someone who understands is one who "sees";
someone who doesn't get it is "blind." Claims of privacy invasion are
claims about unwanted subjection to the knowledge or power of oth-
ers. Within this metaphoric framework, it makes sense for such claims
to be conceptualized in terms of seeing and being seen.
Yet this way of understanding privacy carries significant intellec-
tual and political costs. If it makes sense to conceptualize privacy
problems in terms of visibility, it also makes sense to conclude that
problems that cannot be so conceptualized are not privacy problems.
As Solove observes, identifying privacy problems becomes analytically
more difficult when there is no single Big Brother at which to point."
Privacy doubters, meanwhile, often cannot get past the ways in which
the practices that privacy advocates seek to challenge fail to align with
the dominant metaphors. But knowledge, power, and sight are not the
same. If "privacy" really is meant to denote an effective barrier to
knowledge or the exercise of power by others, equating privacy inva-
sion with visibility assumes what ought to be carefully considered.
Work within the emerging field of surveillance studies calls into
question the implicit linkages between surveillance, visual observation,
and centralization that the conventional metaphors for privacy inva-
sion have tended to reinforce. Scholars in this field have brought a
variety of allied disciplines-including sociology, urban geography,
communications theory, and cultural studies-to bear on the institu-
tions and subjects of surveillance. This work enables a richer under-
standing of how surveillance functions, and of what "privacy" interests
might include.
Much work in surveillance studies builds upon Michel Foucault's
landmark study of the prison and its role in the emergence of modern
techniques of social discipline.' US privacy theorists have drawn on
this work primarily for its discussion of Bentham's Panopticon, but
have tended not to notice that Foucault offered the Panopticon as a
metaphor for a different and more comprehensive sort of discipline
that is concerned more fundamentally with classification and normali-
zation. 5 One of his central insights was that in modern societies social
discipline is accomplished by statistical methods. "[W]hereas the ju-
also George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Chal-
lenge to Western Thought 393-96 (Basic Books 1999). According to Bernard Hibbitts, the cultural
preeminence of sight is linked to the spread of literacy, and reached its zenith with the development
of Cartesian rationalism. Bernard J. Hibbitts, Making Sense of Metaphors: Visuality, Aurality, and the
Reconfiguration ofAmerican Legal Discourse, 16 Cardozo L Rev 229,244-61 (1994).
13 See Solove, The Digital Person at 33-35 (cited in note 9).
14 See generally Foucault, Discipline and Punish (cited in note 10).
15 See id at 205-06. The exception is James Boyle, Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance,
Sovereignty, and Hardwired Censors, 66 U Cin L Rev 177,184-88 (1997).
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ridical systems define juridical subjects according to universal norms,
the disciplines characterize, classify, specialize; they distribute along a
scale, around a norm, hierarchize individuals in relation to one an-
other and, if necessary, disqualify and invalidate."'" This process does
not require a centralized authority; instead, it is most powerful when it
is most widely dispersed among the civil and private institutions that
regulate everyday life." These observations, which have obvious appli-
cation to a wide variety of statistical and actuarial practices performed
in both government and private sectors, have served as the foundation
for elaboration of the work of modern "surveillance societies."'"
Surveillance in the panoptic sense thus functions both descrip-
tively and normatively. It does not simply render personal information
accessible but rather seeks to render individual behaviors and prefer-
ences transparent by conforming them to preexisting frameworks. And
in seeking to mold the future, surveillance also shapes the past: by cre-
ating fixed records of presence, appearance, and behavior, surveillance
constitutes institutional and social memory."
Some surveillance theorists argue that surveillance in postindus-
trial, digitally networked societies is even more radically decentralized
and resilient than Foucault's work suggests. Building on Gilles
Deleuze and F6lix Guattari's work on systems of social control,"
Kevin Haggerty and Richard Ericson argue that the prevailing modal-
ity of surveillance is the "surveillant assemblage": a heterogeneous,
loosely coupled set of institutions that seek to harness the raw power
of information by fixing flows of information cognitively and spa-
tially.2 Surveillant assemblages grow rhizomatically, "across a series of
interconnected roots which throw up shoots in different locations,"
and for this reason they are extraordinarily resistant to localized dis-
ruption." Of critical importance, the surveillant assemblage operates
16 Foucault, Discipline and Punish at 223 (cited in note 10).
17 Id at 207-17,222-27.
18 See David Lyon, Surveillance Society: Monitoring Everyday Life 33-35, 114-18 (Open
University 2001); Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., The Panoptic Sort: A Political Economy of Personal Informa-
tion 15-52 (Westview 1993). See generally David Murakami Wood, ed, Surveillance Studies Network,
A Report on the Surveillance Society (Mark Siddoway/Knowledge House 2006); Kirstie Ball, Ele-
ments of Surveillance: A New Framework and Future Directions, 5 Info Commun & Socy 573 (2002).
19 See Michael R. Curry and Leah A. Lievrouw, Places to Read Anonymously: The Ecology
on Attention and Forgetting 5 (working paper, 2004), online at http://www.spatial.maine.edu/-nittel/lp/
curry-lievrouw-paper.pdf (visited Jan 12, 2008), quoting Jean-Franqois Blanchette and Deborah
G. Johnson, Data Retention and the Panoptic Society: The Social Benefits of Forgetfulness, 18 Info
Socy 33,35 (2002).
20 Gilles Deleuze and F61ix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia
(Minnesota 1987) (Brian Massumi, trans).
21 Kevin D. Haggerty and Richard V. Ericson, The Surveillant Assemblage, 51 Brit J Sociol-
ogy 605,605 (2000).
22 Idat614.
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upon its subjects not only by the "normalized soul training" of Fou-
cauldian theory, but also by seduction. " Flows of information within the
surveillant assemblage promise a cornucopia of benefits and pleasures,
including price discounts, social status, and voyeuristic entertainment. In
return, the surveillant assemblage demands full enrollment.
An alternative approach to surveillance studies uses performance
theory to interrogate the effects of networked databases on the per-
formance of identity. Performance theory melds the methodologies of
speech act theory, which emphasizes the performative force of utter-
ances; cultural anthropology, which describes culture as arising
through performance; and deconstruction, which regards language as
encoding multiple texts rather than universal truths. Performance
theorists argue that "identity" is neither fixed nor unitary, but rather is
constituted by performances that are directed at different audiences."
From this perspective, the problem with surveillance is that it seeks to
constitute individuals as fixed texts upon which invariant meanings
can be imposed." The struggle for privacy is recast as the individual's
effort to assert multiplicity and resist "norming." This account empha-
sizes agency to a far greater degree than the Foucauldian and Deleu-
zian accounts. It too is concerned with normalization and transpar-
ency, but it argues that human nature is much more impervious to
normalization and transparency than those literatures suggest, and
that the subjects of surveillance are knowing and only partially com-
pliant participants in their own seduction.
Unlike their European and Canadian counterparts, US privacy
theorists generally have resisted making these connections between
transparency, normalization, seduction, and fixity of meaning. Some
US privacy theorists have argued that the collection and aggregation
of personal information is harmful because it creates the potential for
23 Id at 615-16.
24 Canonical works in these fields include J.L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Har-
vard 1962); Clifford Geertz, Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture, in The
Interpretation of Cultures 3 (Basic 1973); Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday
Life (Doubleday Anchor 1959); Jacques Derrida, Signature Event Context, in Margins of Phi-
losophy 307 (Chicago 1982) (Alan Bass, trans).
25 See, for example, Andrew Parker and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Introduction, in Andrew
Parker and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, eds, Performativity and Performance 1, 6-8 (Routledge 1995);
Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity 24-25 (Routledge 1990).
26 See David J. Phillips, From Privacy to Visibility: Context, Identity, and Power in Ubiqui-
tous Computing Environments, 23 Soc Text 95, 101 (2005); John E. McGrath, Loving Big Brother:
Performance, Privacy and Surveillance Space 12-14 (Routledge 2004); Hille Koskela, Webcams,
TV Shows, and Mobile Phones: Empowering Exhibitionism, 2 Surveillance & Socy 199, 206
(2004); Stan Karas, Privacy, Identity, Databases, 52 Am U L Rev 393,417-24 (2002).
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hasty and erroneous judgments." That argument seems to presume the
existence of a fixed self defined by a set of invariant, theoretically ac-
cessible truths; it suggests that the problem with profiling is its inevi-
table, unacceptably high rate of error. Antidiscrimination theorists
have focused on the ways in which profiling intersects with harmful
stereotypes about minority groups, but have tended to resist generaliz-
ing that insight to profiling and normalization more generally.8 Sur-
veillance theorists, in contrast, argue that the logics of transparency
and discrimination are inseparable.2 They also identify a more funda-
mental inequality embedded in the logic of informational transpar-
ency. The transparency sought by surveillance runs only one way; it
does not extend to the algorithms and benchmarks by which all indi-
viduals in surveillance societies are categorized and sorted.
US privacy scholars' resistance to the theoretical approaches em-
ployed by surveillance studies scholars also is not especially surprising,
as it is rooted in core commitments-to individual autonomy and to
the possibility of value-neutral knowledge of human nature-that de-
rive from the tradition of liberal political economy within which US
legal academics are primarily trained. Those commitments tend to
foreclose other approaches that emphasize the mutually constitutive
interactions between self and culture, the social construction of sys-
tems of knowledge, and the interplay between systems of knowledge
and systems of power. They therefore require rejection of the docile
bodies of Foucauldian theory, the assimilated denizens of Deleuzian
systems of social control, and the fragmentary, protean selves posited
by performance theorists.
It is possible, however, to meld all three sets of insights about the
function of surveillance with the more traditionally liberal concerns
that have preoccupied US privacy theorists. One can choose to under-
stand liberal political theory and Foucauldian poststructuralism as
delineating irreconcilable opposites, or one can understand them as
describing two (equally implausible) endpoints on a continuum along
which social influence and individual liberty combine in varying pro-
portions. As a counterpoint to the universalist aspirations of liberal
political theory, Foucauldian theory seeks to cultivate a critical stance
27 See generally Rosen, The Unwanted Gaze (cited in note 7); Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues
of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections against Disclosure, 53 Duke L J 967 (2003).
28 See, for example, Frederick Schauer, Profiles, Probabilities, and Stereotypes 22 (Belknap
2003); Deborah Hellman, The Expressive Dimension of Equal Protection, 85 Minn L Rev 1
(2000); David Cole, No Equal Justice: Race and Class in the American Criminal Justice System 16-27
(New Press 1999).
29 See, for example, Oscar Gandy, Jr., Data Mining, Surveillance, and Discrimination in the
Post-9/11 Environment, in Kevin D. Haggerty and Richard V. Ericson, eds, The New Politics of
Surveillance and Visibility 363, 363--64 (Toronto 2006).
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toward claims to knowledge)0 Performance theory takes background
social shaping for granted and focuses on the range of motion that it
affords for the process of self-articulation through experimentation
and play. Haggerty and Ericson's theory of the surveillant assemblage,
meanwhile, seeks to cultivate a subtler appreciation of the affective
dimensions of social control. In a society committed at least to the
desirability of the liberal ideal of self-determination, these perspec-
tives on surveillance are important. In such a society, pervasive trans-
parency is troubling because it constrains the range of motion for the
development of subjectivity through both criticism and performance,
and it does not automatically cease to be troubling when the subjects
of surveillance have indicated their willing surrender.
This account of the relation between informational transparency
and subjectivity is attractive, moreover, because it offers a useful per-
spective on philosophical differences among US legal theorists and
philosophers about the ultimate value of privacy. Some theorists have
asserted that privacy serves principally instrumental values, while oth-
ers are adamant in linking privacy deontologically to care for the (lib-
eral) self. Privacy performs both functions. Choices about the permis-
sible extent and nature of surveillance are choices about the scope for
self-articulation; in a very real sense, they are what enable or disable
pursuit of the ideal that the liberal self represents. For precisely that
reason, they are also choices about the definition and articulation of
collective identity.
The account of privacy as relative informational opacity runs into
difficulty, however, when we return to the problem of visual surveil-
lance in public places. In particular, an informational transparency
framework for conceptualizing privacy harms suggests that purely
localized visual surveillance is relatively innocuous. The real danger to
privacy comes from databases; visual surveillance creates pressing
privacy threats only when it is digital, networked, and combined with
other sources of information. Yet the theory doesn't align with the
practice: surveillance cameras produce effects that are experienced by
real people as altering levels of experienced privacy. This suggests that
the informational transparency framework is incomplete.
II. VISIBILITY AND EXPOSURE
Linking privacy to informational transparency tends to mask a
conceptually distinct privacy harm that is spatial, and concerns the
30 Consider Bernard E. Harcourt, An Answer to the Question: "What Is Poststructuralism?,"
(Chicago Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No 156, Mar 2007), online at http://ssm.com/
abstract=970348 (visited Jan 12,2008).
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nature of the spaces constituted by and for pervasive, continuous ob-
servation. Those spaces are characterized by what I will call a condi-
tion of exposure. The term "condition" is intended to signify that ex-
posure is not a given but rather a design principle that in turn con-
strains the range of available behaviors and norms. Neither privacy
law nor privacy theory has recognized an interest in limiting exposure
uncoupled from the generally acknowledged interest in limiting ob-
servation, and in general we lack a vocabulary for conceptualizing and
evaluating such an interest.
Since the US legal system purports to recognize an interest in
spatial privacy, it is useful to begin there. Doctrinally, whether surveil-
lance invades a legally recognized interest in spatial privacy depends
in the first instance on background rules of property ownership. Gen-
erally speaking, surveillance is fair game within public space, and also
within spaces owned by third parties, but not within spaces owned by
the targets of surveillance. Those baseline rules, however, do not in-
variably determine the outcomes of privacy disputes. Expectations
deemed objectively reasonable can trump the rules that otherwise
would apply in a particular space. Thus, for example, a residential ten-
ant is entitled to protection against direct visual observation by the
landlord even though she does not own the premises,"1 and a home-
owner is not necessarily entitled to protection against direct visual
observation by airplane overflight,32 nor to privacy in items left out for
garbage collection." Employees sometimes can assert privacy interests
against undisclosed workplace surveillance.34
For purposes of this essay, the interesting thing about the reason-
able expectations test is that it is fundamentally concerned not with
expectations about the nature of particular spaces, but rather with
expectations about the accessibility of information about activities
taking place in those spaces. Even the exceptions prove the rule: Kyllo
v United States,5 styled as a ringing reaffirmation of the traditional
privacy interest in the home, in fact upholds that interest only against
information-gathering technologies "not in general public use."36 Simi-
larly, although legal scholars disagree about the precise nature of the
privacy interest, they seem to agree that cognizable injury would re-
31 See Hamberger v Eastman, 206 A2d 239, 242 (NH 1964). See also Chapman v United
States, 365 US 610,616-17 (1961).
32 See Florida v Riley, 488 US 445, 451 (1989); California v Ciraolo, 476 US 207, 214-15
(1986).
33 See California v Greenwood, 486 US 35,40 (1988).
34 See O'Connor v Ortega, 480 US 709,713-14 (1987); Mancusi v DeForte, 392 US 364,369
(1968).
35 533 US 27 (2001).
36 Id at 34.
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quire the involvement of a human observer who perceives or receives
information." Focusing on the accessibility of information also explains
why no privacy interest attaches to most activities in public spaces and
nonresidential spaces owned by third parties: persons who voluntarily
enter such premises have impliedly consented to being seen there.
In short, and paradoxically, prevailing legal understandings of
spatial privacy do not recognize a harm that is distinctively spatial:
that flows from the ways in which surveillance, whether visual or data-
based, alters the spaces and places of everyday life. The information
privacy law project has tended to ratify this omission, precisely be-
cause its primary interest has been information rather than the bodies
and spaces to which it pertains. Many information privacy theorists
criticize spatial metaphors in privacy discourse, arguing that they
muddy rigorous analysis of privacy issues in the information age."
And this resistance too is rooted in the tradition of liberal political
economy, which for the most part does not consider concrete, particu-
lar bodies and spaces at all.
Yet resistance to spatialization in privacy theory leaves important
dimensions of the experience of surveillance unexplained. Consider an
individual who is reading a newspaper at a plaza caf6 in front of a
downtown office building. The building's owner has installed surveil-
lance cameras that monitor the plaza on a twenty-four-hour basis.
Let's assume the cameras in this example are clearly visible, and
clearly low-tech and analog. It would be reasonable for the individual
to assume that they probably are not connected to anything other
than the building's own private security system. Most likely, tapes are
stored for a short period of time and then reused. The consensus view
in US privacy theory tends to be that there is essentially no legitimate
expectation of privacy under these circumstances, and that the surveil-
lance therefore should not trouble us. But those surveilled often feel
quite differently. Even localized, uncoordinated surveillance may be
experienced as intrusive in ways that have nothing to do with whether
data trails are captured; Or consider the ways in which spatial meta-
37 See, for example, Rosen, The Unwanted Gaze at 8 (cited in note 7); Lisa Austin, Privacy
and the Question of Technology, 22 Law & Phil 119, 126 (2003); Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the
Limits of Law, 89 Yale L J 421,432 (1980) ("[Alttention alone will cause a loss of privacy even if
no new information becomes known.").
38 See, for example, Solove, 90 Cal L Rev at 1094-95, 1151 (cited in note 8); Lloyd L. Wein-
reb, The Right to Privacy, in Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr., and Jeffrey Paul, eds, The
Right to Privacy 25,26-27 (Cambridge 2000). The exception is Helen Nissenbaum, who does not
criticize spatialization and whose "contextual integrity" framework for privacy accommodates
spatial privacy interests. See Nissenbaum, 79 Wash L Rev at 137-42 (cited in note 7).
39 See generally Don Mitchell, The Right to the City: Social Justice and the Fight for Public
Space (Guilford 2003). See also Marc Jonathan Blitz, Video Surveillance and the Constitution of
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phors continually recur in discussions of privacy. Even in contexts that
are not thought to involve spatial privacy at all, judges and scholars
repeatedly refer to "spheres" and "zones" to describe the privacy that
the law should attempt to guarantee."
Because information-based analytical frameworks don't recog-
nize these dimensions of the spatial privacy interest, commentators
operating within those frameworks tend to question whether they are
"real." Yet that conclusion denies the logic of embodied, situated ex-
perience. Surveillance infrastructures alter the experience of places in
ways that do not depend entirely on whether anyone is actually watch-
ing. Governments know this well; that is part of the point of deploying
surveillance infrastructures within public spaces. It seems sounder to
conclude that the information-based frameworks are incomplete.
Conceptualizing the privacy interest as having an independently sig-
nificant spatial dimension explains aspects of surveillance that neither
visibility nor informational transparency can explain.
Work in surveillance studies suggests that direct visual surveil-
lance affects the experience of space and place in two ways that an
emphasis on informational transparency doesn't completely capture.
First, surveillance fosters a kind of passivity that is best described as a
ceding of power over space. As geographer Hille Koskela puts it, vis-
ual surveillance constitutes "space as a container" for passive objects.'
She distinguishes the spatial shaping that produces "container-space"
from the "power-space" constituted by panoptic strategies of normali-
zation, which depend on access to particularized information. But the
"containerization" of space is itself a panoptic strategy. Panopticism in
the Foucauldian sense is both statistical and architectural; it entails
ordering of spaces to obviate the need for continual surveillance and
to instill tractability in those who enter. 2 Our newspaper-reading indi-
vidual cannot see whether anyone is watching her, but she can see that
the plaza has been re-architected to allow observation secretly and at
will, and that there is no obvious source of information about the sur-
veillance and no evident method of recourse if she wishes to lodge a
Public Space: Fitting the Fourth Amendment to a World That Tracks Image and Identity, 82 Tex L
Rev 1349,1374-98 (2004).
40 See, for example, Zablocki v Redhail, 434 US 374, 397 n 1 (1978) (Powell concurring)
(observing that the Court's prior decisions establish a "sphere of privacy or autonomy" within
the marital relationship); Griswold v Connecticut, 381 US 479, 485 (1965) (describing a "zone of
privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees"); Dietemann v Time, Inc, 449
F2d 245,248-49 (9th Cir 1971).
41 Hille Koskela, "The Gaze without Eyes": Video-surveillance and the Changing Nature of
Urban Space, 24 Progress in Hum Geography 243,250 (2000).
42 See Foucault, Discipline and Punish at 206 (cited in note 10); Julie E. Cohen, Pervasively
Distributed Copyright Enforcement, 95 Georgetown L J 1, 23 (2006).
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complaint. In Hohfeldian terms," the reconfiguration places individu-
als under a twofold disability: the targets of surveillance cannot en-
tirely avoid the gaze (except by avoiding the place) and also cannot
identify the watchers. We can say, therefore, that surveillance alters the
balance of powers and disabilities that obtains in public places. It in-
stills an expectation of being surveilled, and contrary to the conven-
tional legal wisdom, this reasonable expectation and the passivity that
it instills are precisely the problem.
Performance theory reminds us that individuals surveilled are not
only passive bodies, and this leads us to the second way in which sur-
veillance affects the experience of space and place. Like identities,
places are dynamic and relational; they are constructed over time
through everyday practice." Surveillance alters important parameters
of both processes. Building on work in feminist geography, Koskela
argues that surveillance alters a sense of space that she calls "emo-
tional space." She observes that "[t]o be under surveillance is an am-
bivalent emotional event. A surveillance camera ... can at the same
time represent safety and danger."' 5 This point contrasts usefully with
US privacy theorists' comparatively single-minded focus on the "chill-
ing effect"; it reminds us that surveillance changes the affective di-
mension of space in ways that that formulation doesn't address. Marc
Aug6 has argued that the defining feature of contemporary geography
is the "non-place." 6 Places are historical and relational; non-places
exist in the present and are characterized by a sense of temporariness,
openness, and solitariness. 7 Aug6 does not discuss surveillance, but the
distinction between places and non-places maps well to the affective
dimension of space that Koskela identifies. Aug6's critics observe that
"placeness" is a matter of perspective; for example, airports may be
places to those who work there, while wealthy residential enclaves
may be non-places to those whose entry incites automatic suspicion. 4
It may be most accurate to conceptualize "placeness" both as a matter
of degree and as an attribute that may be experienced differently by
different groups. Along this continuum, surveillance makes places
43 See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning and Other Legal Essays 35-64 (Yale 1919) (Walter Wheeler Cook, ed).
44 See generally Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space (Blackwell 1991) (Donald Nichol-
son-Smith, trans).
45 Koskela, 24 Progress in Hum Geography at 257 (cited in note 41).
46 See Marc Aug6, Non-places: Introduction to an Anthropology of Supermodernity 75-115
(Verso 1995) (John Howe, trans).
47 ld at 77-86.
48 See generally Peter Merriman, Driving Places: Marc Augg, Non-places, and the Geogra-
phies of England's M1 Motorway, 21 Theory, Culture, & Socy 145 (2004).
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more like non-places. Spaces exposed by surveillance function differ-
ently than spaces that are not so exposed.
I will characterize the spatial dimension of the privacy interest as
an interest in avoiding or selectively controlling the conditions of ex-
posure. This terminology is intended to move the discussion beyond
both visibility and transparency to capture the linked effects of archi-
tecture and power as experienced by embodied, situated subjects. With
respect to space, surveillance employs a twofold dynamic of contain-
erization and constraint to pursue large-scale behavioral modification.
Koskela observes that surveillance makes public spaces less predictable
for the watched." The relation is reciprocal: surveillance also attempts
to make those spaces more predictable for the watchers. By altering the
balance of powers and disabilities, exposure changes the parameters
that shape the ongoing performance of identity, community, and place.
The effects of exposure and transparency are complementary, and
the genius of surveillance appears most clearly when one considers
them together. Transparency alters the parameters of evolving subjec-
tivity; exposure alters the capacity of places to function as contexts
within which identity is developed and performed. Surveillance di-
rected at transparency seeks to systematize, predict, and channel dif-
ference; surveillance directed at exposure seeks to prevent unsystema-
tized, unpredictable difference from emerging.
III. EXPOSURE ONLINE
This understanding of the spatial dimension of privacy is relevant
not only to physical spaces, but also to the ongoing debate about pri-
vacy interests in online conduct. The mismatch between online con-
duct and fixed physical place is one of the principal reasons that pri-
vacy theorists have offered to support a purely information-based
definition of privacy interests. Privacy skeptics, meanwhile, assert that
whether or not online forums correspond to physical places, online
conduct that is visible to others is not private in any meaningful sense.
Both arguments overlook the extent to which online conduct and
online surveillance are experienced spatially.
Let us now zoom in on our caf6-sitting individual as she uses her
laptop computer to explore the web, view and download "content,"
write pseudonymous blog posts, and send email. Privacy rules derived
from ownership and expectation suggest that she can have no legally
cognizable expectation of privacy in most of these activities. The soft-
ware is licensed, the communications networks are owned by third
49 Koskela, 24 Progress in Hum Geography at 250 (cited in note 41).
[75:181
Privacy, Visibility, Transparency, and Exposure
parties, and it is increasingly common knowledge that online activities
are potentially subject to pervasive surveillance by governments and
commercial interests. Federal statutes carve out limited zones of pri-
vacy, but as their definitional frameworks are challenged by rapid
technological change, those statutes more often serve to highlight the
absence of a generally applicable privacy interest in online activity.
Here again, the reasonable expectation standard begs the ques-
tion: when does surveillance of online activities change expectations in
a way that we as a society should find objectionable? As the hypo-
thetical suggests, the question cannot be answered simply by invoking
an expanded conception of the privacy of the home. Information pri-
vacy theorists have objected, rightly, that this move tethers spatial pri-
vacy interests to a fixed physical space and ignores the fact that many
online activities occur outside the home. A privacy analysis for the
information age must focus on something other than physical location.
The question also cannot be answered by reifying communica-
tions networks as separate "spaces." Online "space" is not separate
from "real" space. Communications networks are layered over and
throughout real space, producing a social space that in totality is more
accurately understood as networked space."' Actions taken in physical
space have important consequences online, and vice versa. In ways
that "real" space does not, online "space" contains material traces of
intellectual, emotional, and relational movement, but privacy law and
policy must be crafted for those who live in the real world.
A viable theory of privacy for the networked information age
must consider the extent to which the "privacy of the home" has
served as a sort of cultural shorthand for a broader privacy interest
against exposure. The home affords a freedom of movement that is
both literal and metaphorical, and that has physical, intellectual, and
emotional dimensions: we can move from room to room, we can speak
our minds and read whatever interests us, we can pursue intimacy in
relationships. The advent of networked space challenges privacy theo-
rists to articulate a more general account of the spatial entailments of
intellectual, emotional, and relational activities. By analogy to the
home, we might envision a zone of personal space that permits (de-
grees of) unconstrained, unobserved physical and intellectual move-
ment. That zone furnishes room for a critical, playful subjectivity to
develop. This account of spatial privacy matches the experience of
privacy in ways that the purely informational conception does not.
When the spatial dimension of privacy is understood in this way,
it becomes easier to see that surveillance of online activities alters the
50 See Julie E. Cohen, Cyberspace as/and Space, 107 Colum L Rev 210,235-48 (2007).
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experience of space in the same ways that surveillance of "real" places
does. From the standpoint of Foucauldian theory, surveillance of
online activities is a logical extension of the panoptic gaze, and not
only for purposes of imposing transparency and normalization. To be
most effective, the "containerization" of space must extend to intellec-
tual, emotional, and relational processes conducted online. From the
standpoint of Deleuzian theory, surveillance of online activities fur-
thers the goals of the surveillant assemblage; it hastens the conversion
of bodies and behaviors into flows of data." As in physical space, ex-
posure of activities in networked space alters the affective dimension
of online conduct. That process in turn affects the ongoing construc-
tion of self, place, and community not only on the network, but within
networked space more generally.
Other social and technological changes also can alter the balance
of powers and disabilities that exists in networked space. Imagine now
that our caf6-sitting individual engages in some embarrassing and un-
savory behavior-perhaps she throws her used paper cup and napkin
into the bushes, or coughs on the milk dispenser. Another patron of
the cafd photographs her with his mobile phone and posts the photo-
graphs to an internet site dedicated to shaming the behavior. 2 This
example reminds us that being in public entails a degree of exposure,
and that (like informational transparency) sometimes exposure can
have beneficial consequences.53 Maybe we don't want people to litter
or spread germs, or to drive aggressively," and if the potential for ex-
posure reduces the incidence of those behaviors, so much the better.
Or suppose our caf6-sitter posts her own location to an internet site
that lets its members log their whereabouts and activities." This exam-
ple reminds us that exposure may be desired and eagerly pursued; in
such cases, worries about privacy seem entirely off the mark. But the
problem of exposure in networked space is more complicated than
these examples suggest.
The sort of conduct in the first example, which antisurveillance
activist Steve Mann calls "coveillance," figures prominently in two
different claims about diminished expectations of privacy in public.
Privacy critics argue that when technologies for surveillance are in
51 See Haggerty and Ericson, 51 Brit J Sociology at 608-09 (cited in note 21).
52 See, for example, HollaBackNYC, online at http://hollabacknyc.blogspot.com (visited
Jan 12, 2008); How Drunk Am I?, online at http://www.howdrunkami.com (visited Jan 12, 2008).
See also Kevin Werbach, Sensors and Sensibilities, 28 Cardozo L Rev 2321, 2325-29 (2007).
53 It also reminds us that online "space" and "real" space are not separate.
54 See generally Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, "How's My Driving?" for Everyone (and Every-
thing?), 81 NYU L Rev 1699 (2006).
55 See, for example, Twitter, online at http://www.twitter.com (visited Jan 12,2008).
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common use, their availability can eliminate expectations of privacy
that might previously have existed. Mann argues that because coveil-
lance involves observation by equals, it avoids the troubling political
implications of surveillance." But if the caf6-sitter's photograph had
been posted to a site that collects photographs of "hot chicks," many
women would understand the photographer's conduct as an act of
subordination.57 And there is more than an element of bootstrapping
to the argument that coveillance eliminates expectations of privacy
vis-A-vis surveillance. This is so whether or not one accepts the argu-
ment that coveillance and surveillance are meaningfully different. If
they are different, then coveillance doesn't justify or excuse the exer-
cise of power that surveillance represents. If they are the same, then
the interest against exposure applies equally to both.
In practice, the relation between surveillance and coveillance is
more mutually constituting than either of these arguments acknowl-
edges. Many employers now routinely search the internet for informa-
tion about prospective hires, so what began as "ordinary" coveillance
can become the basis for a probabilistic judgment about attributes,
abilities, and aptitudes. At other times, public authorities seek to har-
ness the distributed power of coveillance for their own purposes-for
example, by requesting identification of people photographed at pro-
test rallies.: Here what began as surveillance becomes an exercise of
distributed moral and political power, but it is power called forth for a
particular purpose.
The relation between surveillance and self-exposure is similarly
complex. Exposure is a critical enabler of interpersonal association;
indeed, some feminist theorists argue that we are constituted pre-
dominantly by our relationships. 9 From this perspective, the argument
that privacy functions principally to enable interpersonal intimacy gets
it only half right.i° Intimate relationships, community relationships,
56 Steve Mann, Jason Nolan, and Barry Wellman, Sousveillance: Inventing and Using Wear-
able Computing Devices for Data Collection in Surveillance Environments, 1 Surveillance & Socy
331,348 (2003).
57 See Ellen Nakashima, Harsh Words Die Hard on the Web; Law Students Feel Lasting Ef-
fects of Anonymous Attacks, Wash Post A01 (Mar 7,2007); Jill Filipovic, Hi, I'm Jill, and Scummy
Law School Sleazebags Have Gone after Me, Too, Feministe (Mar 7,2007), online at http://www. fem-
iniste.us/blog/archives/2007/03/07/wapo-calls-out-law-school-pervs (visited Jan 12,2008).
58 See Wayne Harrison, CU Posts Pictures of Pot-smoking Event: Reward Offered for In-
formation about People in Photos, ABC 7 News Online (Apr 28,2006), online at http://www.thedenver-
channel.com/news/9063737/detail.htmI (visited Jan 12, 2008); Texas Border Watch, http://www.texas-
borderwatch.com (visited Jan 12,2008).
59 See, for example, Jennifer Nedelsky, Law, Boundaries, and the Bounded Self, in Robert
Post, ed, Law and the Order of Culture 162,169 (California 1991).
60 See, for example, Julie C. inness, Privacy, Intimacy, and Isolation 74-94 (Oxford 1992);
Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 Yale L J 475,484 (1968).
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and more casual relationships all derive from selective exposure: from
the ability to control in different ways and to differing extents what
Erving Goffman called the "presentation of self."" It is this recogni-
tion that underlies the different levels of "privacy" enabled by some
(though not all) social networking sites.2 Scholars who study queer
communities argue that exposure of matters conventionally consid-
ered "private" fulfills a similar function, enabling the formation of
alternative communities constituted around challenges to conven-
tional models of intimacy.63 Surveillance changes the various dynamics
of selective exposure, but the strand of surveillance studies literature
affiliated with performance theory argues that exposure to surveil-
lance can be similarly productive. Surveillance cameras can represent
an invitation to perform in ways that transgress stated or implicit
norms or exaggerate imputed characteristics; by the same token, self-
exposure using networked information technologies can operate as
resistance to narratives imposed by others.4 The performative impulse
introduces static into the circuits of the surveillant assemblage; it seeks
to reclaim bodies and reappropriate spaces.
As this analysis suggests, interpreting self-exposure either as a
blanket waiver of privacy or as an exercise in personal empowerment
would be far too simple. Surveillance and self-exposure bleed into one
another in the same ways that surveillance and coveillance do. As Jane
Bailey and Ian Kerr demonstrate, and as millions of subscribers to
social networking sites are now beginning to learn, the ability to con-
trol the terms of self-exposure in networked space is largely illusory:
body images intended to assert feminist self-ownership are remixed as
pornography, while revelations intended for particular social networks
are accessed with relative ease by employers, police, and other author-
ity figures.5 Other scholars raise important questions about the origins
of the desire for exposure. In an increasing number of contexts, the
images generated by surveillance have fetish value. As Kirstie Ball
puts it, surveillance creates a "political economy of interiority" organ-
61 See generally Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (cited in note 24);
Irwin Altman, The Environment and Social Behavior: Privacy, Personal Space, Territory, Crowd-
ing (Brooks/Cole 1975).
62 See, for example, Protect Your Privacy, Facebook, online at http://www.facebook.com/
sitetour/privacy.php (visited Jan 12,2008).
63 See McGrath, Loving Big Brother at 61-62 (cited in note 26). See generally Michael
Warner, Publics and Counterpublics (Zone Books 2002).
64 See McGrath, Loving Big Brother at 14-16 (cited in note 26); Koskela, Webcams, TV
Shows, and Mobile Phones at 206-07 (cited in note 26).
65 Jane Bailey and Ian Kerr, Seizing Control?: The Experience Capture Experiments of
Ringley and Mann, 9 Ethics & Info Tech 129,132,137 (2007).
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ized around "the 'authenticity' of the captured experience." Within this
political economy, self-exposure "may represent patriotic or participa-
tive values to the individual,' 67 but it also may be a behavior called forth
by surveillance and implicated in its informational and spatial logics.
These examples argue for more careful exploration of the indi-
vidual and systemic consequences of exposure within networked
space, however it is caused. While the law should not ignore changing
social dynamics, it also should not overlook or oversimplify their
causes and effects. Exposure online is a matter of concern for the
same reasons that exposure in "real" space is; indeed, as the phe-
nomenon of coveillance shows, the two cannot really be separated.
IV. TRANSPARENCY, EXPOSURE, AND PRIVACY SELF-DEFENSE
Finally, understanding privacy interests as including interests
against both transparency and exposure raises questions about the
efficacy of tools and practices for privacy self-defense. Modes of pri-
vacy self-defense directed solely at minimizing or equalizing visual or
informational accessibility do not necessarily address the more gen-
eral problems of transparency and exposure. Even if tools for privacy
self-defense were designed with these more general problems in mind,
it's not clear that the effort would succeed.
To see why, consider two general classes of privacy self-defense
tools. The first consist of tools for "watching from below," or "sousveil-
lance." A leading exponent of sousveillance is Mann, who employs
wearable cameras to document visual surveillance in progress. When
challenged by property managers or security personnel, he answers
that the cameras are not under his direct control, and that it's up to his
"controller" whether to turn them off. Mann envisions sousveillance
as a species of situationist critique of surveillance: it is a way to "chal-
lenge and problematize both surveillance and acquiescence to it.'"
As political performance art, sousveillance is brilliant. At times,
however, Mann also appears to envision the condition of constant
sousveillance as a normatively desirable way of living in the world. He
contrasts the "reflectionism" of sousveillance with top-down privacy
regulation, which he characterizes as a "pacifier," and argues that
sousveillance emphasizes equality and participation. 69 That may be so,
but sousveillance does not change the architectural conditions of sur-
66 Kirstie Ball, Exposure: Exploring the Subject of Surveillance 4-5 (unpublished manu-
script, 2007).
67 Id at 1. See also Anita L. Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40 Wm & Mary L Rev 723,743-45 (1999).
68 Mann, Nolan, and Wellman, 1 Surveillance & Socy at 332 (cited in note 56).
69 Id at 333, 345-47. See also David Brin, The Transparent Society: Will Technology Force
Us to Choose between Privacy and Freedom? 3-26 (Addison-Wesley 1998).
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veillance or the underlying inequalities that they reinforce. Nor does it
challenge internalization of the condition of exposure; if anything,
widespread sousveillance likely would produce the opposite effect.
The second general class of privacy self-defense tools consists of
tools for hiding from surveillance. For example, portable Faraday
cages can shield embedded radio-frequency identification (RFID)
chips against external scanning.0 Many privacy activists recommend
that holders of RFID-embedded passports keep them in aluminum
foil wrappers to prevent unauthorized capture of encoded personal
information; one might do the same for one's EZ Pass transponder
between transaction points. Other technologies enable anonymization
of emails and blog posts; some privacy activists and entrepreneurs
have envisioned anonymization becoming routine for a much broader
range of online transactions and interactions.
These examples illustrate that hiding from surveillance can be
easy in some contexts, but they also illustrate that even a robust com-
mitment to hiding would be extraordinarily difficult for ordinary indi-
viduals to sustain in the face of routine practices of embedded com-
puting that pervade networked space. One cannot escape the fact that
the RFID transmitter must be removed from its protective coating in
order to serve its intended purpose, which might be one that the indi-
vidual wants or needs. At transaction points, the encoded information
must be accessible, and at those locations the individual is exposed.
Similarly, major commercial web sites generally are not configured to
permit anonymous or robustly pseudonymous transactions. It is over-
whelmingly likely that transaction points will continue to proliferate.
For most people, the rewards of hiding won't outweigh the conven-
ience of technologies like EZ Pass or the seduction of customer loy-
alty programs. Normatively speaking, it seems unfair to place respon-
sibility for hiding on individuals when the deck is stacked so defini-
tively against them.
Focusing on the spatial dimension of the privacy interest reminds
us that hiding carries other costs as well, and not only those costs that
are conventionally recognized. In "real" space, hiding generally is not
considered a socially neutral activity. Unless it's Halloween or Mardi
Gras, we tend to presume that people who wear masks in public are
up to no good. But we presume this in part because a wide range of
middle options-degrees of de facto anonymity and pseudonymity-
has usually been available. Currently online spaces, like real spaces,
70 See Faraday Cage, SearchSecurity.com, (Information Security Magazine, Dec 21, 2003),
online at http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/sDefinition/O,,sid14_gci942282,00.html (visited Jan
12,2008).
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support a variety of norms regarding "nymity."7' In some online
spaces, nymity is the rule; in others, it occurs often enough to be un-
remarkable; in others, it is unimportant; in still others, it is perceived as
creating risks that may threaten the community's reason for being. If
forced or trivially easy identification became the norm, we might come
to embrace more committed hiding in a broader range of circumstances.
But, just as the nature of "real" space would change profoundly if eve-
ryone wore either a bar code or a mask, the feel of online spaces, and of
networked space more generally, will change accordingly.
The lesson of these examples is not that privacy self-defense is a bad
idea, but rather that privacy self-defense alone can't neutralize either the
institutional predicates of transparency or the architectural predicates of
exposure. Privacy self-defense operates at the individual level, while sur-
veillance operates at the collective level. The informational and spatial
logics of surveillance require a considered, collective response.
CONCLUSION
Within the discourse of privacy, the language of visibility both
conceals and reveals. Understanding privacy as an interest against
visibility/informational accessibility misses an important piece of the
logic of informational transparency. The privacy interest against trans-
parency encompasses not only the individualized information that
surveillance collects, but also the informational frameworks that it
imposes. Yet the problem of visual privacy also points us to dimen-
sions of the privacy interest that a focus on privacy as relative infor-
mational opacity cannot explain. Privacy encompasses an interest in
the structure of experienced space, and this interest is threatened un-
der conditions of visual or informational exposure.
Both transparency and exposure are questions of degree; the law
can't (and shouldn't) regulate every instance of either. But privacy law
and theory should recognize them as independent harms, so that a
conversation about possible responses can proceed.
71 Ian Kerr and Alex Cameron, Nymity, P2P and ISPs: Lessons from BMG Canada Inc. v.
John Doe, in Katherine Strandburg and Daniela Stan Raicu, eds, Privacy and Technologies of
Identity:A Cross-disciplinary Conversation 269, 271-72 (Springer 2006).
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